China has developed its own domestic carbon markets by setting up emission trading schemes. This study addresses concerns about the functioning of these schemes and the financial performance of the Chinese carbon market. It aims to assess an actual outcome of this policy intervention, i.e. trading records, which were used in our analysis to examine a key financial property of the allowance-based market in Shenzhen. In a mature market, assets that incur higher risks are likely to yield higher returns, i.e. a positive relationship. To examine this property, we solicited historical data on the price and trading volume of emission allowances. We statistically estimated the degree of volatility in the Shenzhen market and its relationship with expected return premium. We found that the rate of return was negatively associated with expected risk. This stands at odds with the usual expectation in the financial market and the prediction of asset pricing theory. Also, kurtosis in trading volume was excessively high and its fluctuations were highly concentrated. We discuss these findings in terms of market liquidity and information uncertainties, and offer some policy recommendations. More regulatory attention and economic fixes are needed to improve market efficiency and eliminate sources of market distortions.
Introduction
According to the International Energy Agency [1] , carbon emissions from fuel combustion rose from 26,177Mt in 2004 to 32,190Mt in 2013 (up 23%) . To keep global temperature change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels, substantial cuts in these emissions are required, i.e. globally 40 to 70 per cent lower in 2050 than in 2010 [2] . The People's Republic of China is the largest carbon emitter, contributing to 28 per cent of the world's total in 2013 [1] .
New policy instruments are being introduced in China to strengthen its efforts on greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation. The past ten years have seen its climate policy preference shifting from the conventional 'command-and-control' approach towards a market-based one [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . The recent arrival of emission trading schemes (ETS) in seven provinces and municipalities of China marked a watershed in the history of Chinese climate policy [11, 12] .
Emission trading involves a regulatory body setting an aggregate limit on the level of the regulated emissions, such as GHGs, and issuing permissions to pollute up to that limit. Entities covered by an ETS must hold enough emission allowances for the amount of the emissions they produce. These allowances represent a cost of production and can be exchanged among entities, and therefore have market value.
Those entities who can reduce emissions at lower costs sell excess allowances, whereas those who find it more costly to reduce pollution buy allowances. The trading of allowances effectively creates a market institution, commonly known as 'carbon market'.
Seventeen ETSs are operating in various national or subnational jurisdictions, covering about 8 per cent of annual global GHG emissions (as of August 2015) [13] .
The implementation of ETSs by China is regarded as a decisive move towards effective GHG mitigation with global impacts. The seven pilot ETSs in China combined form the world's second largest carbon market, after the European Union (EU) ETS. Indicative estimates provided by World Bank [13, p.9] suggest that global GHG emissions covered by carbon pricing initiatives will almost double if a national ETS is implemented in China. However, concern and discussion have been raised within China about the shortcomings and timing of nationwide emission trading [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] .
The use of market-based instruments for controlling GHG emissions is a rather novel attempt in China, which is far from a mature market economy [4, 6, 7, 9, [19] [20] [21] . Liu, Chen [21] have noted that, for example, China's financial sector has experienced systematic distortions due to excessive state intervention in the market, dominance of state-owned enterprises, and official state control over utility prices.
The domestic carbon market in China, predicated upon the pilot ETSs, has reproduced these limitations [18] , leading to low market liquidity and efficiency [12, 14, 22] . These alarming realities might result in poor performance or even the collapse of the Chinese national ETS that is scheduled to commence in or shortly after 2017. Such a possible outcome would pose financial risks to the international carbon market in which China is likely to become a key player and consequently impede global efforts on GHG mitigation. New research is needed to build an empirical basis for understanding and evaluating this major policy intervention in China.
The present research sought further evidence on the functioning of Chinese ETSs, focusing on financial performance. Many studies have addressed their regulatory and management aspects, and come to the conclusion that the pilot designs meet with many challenges [9, 21, 23] . Only a handful of them, however, have explored the market outcomes of this policy intervention. In fact, few developing countries, namely China and Kazakhstan, have established their own carbon market that is built upon domestic legislation and designated to achieve domestic policy goals, due to their hitherto low capacity and motivation to create one. This results in a lack of knowledge about the performance of carbon markets in these countries.
According to the International Carbon Action Partnership [24] , a growing number of developing economies, including Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, have expressed an interest in setting up a sectoral cap-and-trade system for pricing carbon. Our study can help identify the potential weaknesses of these emerging carbon markets from a financial perspective. Lessons from China can make significant contributions to the scholarly debates about these new developments, given that it is currently the only developing economy having established a domestic ETS (the Kazakhstan ETS is temporarily suspended) [24] .
The present research offers new insights by studying an actual outcome (i.e. market transactions) and examining a key financial property of a sub-national carbon market in China. Our objective was to estimate the degree of volatility in this market and its relationship with expected return premium, which can reflect the efficiency of a financial market [25, 26] . Trading records provide a statistical basis for assessing the financial maturity of markets. We solicited data on the price and trading volume of emission allowances traded under a pilot ETS since 2013.
Shenzhen, a megacity in South China, was selected as a case study because of its representativeness. The Shenzhen ETS is the first centrally approved scheme launched in China with the most extensive records on allowance price. Moreover, Shenzhen ETS is the first one in China granted a formal legislative basis [21] , and regarded as more market-oriented, active, and properly designed than the other six sub-national carbon markets in China [27, p.19 and p.54] . Therefore, the Shenzhen ETS could act as a role model and offer lessons for other mandatory ETSs in the pipeline. Our inquiry can shed lights on the performance of this carbon market, through which to inform the ongoing debates as to what need to be addressed in order to overcome its imperfections as China and other developing economies pursue their carbon pricing initiatives.
We begin by providing an overview of the economic context in which the Chinese ETSs are situated and a brief description of Shenzhen City. The section that follows explains our main hypothesis and describes how data were collected. The novelty of this research lies in the use of an established econometric technique, known as 'generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity' (GARCH) model, for analysing Chinese carbon price data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to systematically examine these data using GARCH model and compare with the European experiences on this basis. After describing the data collection approach, we provide details about this technique. Results are then presented, and their implications are discussed in the last two sections.
Background

Recent financial market events in China
Emission trading has enabled the financial market to put a price on the right to emit GHGs into the atmosphere [28, 29] . The financial market in China began to flourish in the early 1980s, following a progressive policy direction that aimed to 'reform and open-up' the obsolete planned economy. Over-the-counter and negotiated deals dominated this market in the first few years. The secondary market was made active in the early 1990s by the Shanghai Stock Exchange [30] and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) established in 19 December 1990 and 3 July 1991, respectively [31] .
The stock markets are currently managed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
The past three decades of financial market management and regulation have proven to be a steep learning curve. The Chinese stock markets in the present day continue to demonstrate many imperfections, including irrational behaviors of individual investors, poorly designed trading mechanisms, ineffective regulations, and flawed policy designs [32] . The combinations of these weaknesses have led to financial breakdowns, the latest one being the stock market crashes in 2015 and 2016. In 12 June 2015, the SSE Composite Index reached its peak at 5,178 points, but dramatically fell to a record low at 3,373 points in 9 July, i.e. down 35 per cent within one month. During this period, the Growth Enterprise index saw a sharp decline of 43 percent, moving downwards from 4,037 points to 2,304 points. Before mid-September 2015, more than 1,000 stocks experienced a limit-down for 16 times [33] . Individual investors lost confidence and the market ran into a chaos. Many stocks suffered from liquidity issue and could not be sold [34, 35] . Managing the massive volatility of financial market has become a pressing issue for Chinese regulators and policymakers. USD16,796) [36] . The CSRC decided to suspend the CBM in the evening of 7 January 2016, after only four days of operation. The striking event broke two records in China's financial history: the shortest duration of transaction in one day and the shortest duration of a major financial policy intervention [37] .
Although the CBM did not contribute to these market crashes, it has demonstrated the failure of Chinese authorities in stabilizing the fast-growing financial market and operating new regulatory mechanisms. The problems associated with the Chinese financial market raise concern about the functioning of the burgeoning carbon market in China, which resembles the stock market in many aspects [38] . Shenzhen, which is home to a major domestic stock market and has experienced market crashes at different times, was designated to run the first carbon ETS in China. 
Research problems to address
Overview of current knowledge
There has been a well-established knowledge base about the implementation of ETSs in developed economies [41] [42] [43] . However, those schemes established by developing economies through domestic legislation remain poorly understood.
Among these economies, China is currently the only one that can offer lessons for others in similar situations. Yet, most of the existing studies about Chinese ETSs are limited to their regulatory and management aspects. GHG emissions data and contend that the data management system in China is far from complete and consistent [14, 23] . Few regulated entities have complete records on their GHG emissions [16, 21] . The limited availability and poor quality of emissions data render the setting of emissions caps arbitrary and disputable. As Munning et al. have indicated, the lack of understanding of business-as-usual emissions has increased the difficulties for regulators and firms to know whether the cap will bind or to predict future allowance prices [22] . Parties involved in allowance trading find no solid information basis for making investment and hedging risks against adverse changes in market conditions.
Another key issue that has attracted criticisms by local scholars is the lack of a robust regulatory system [12, 17, 18, 21] . Allowance-based carbon markets are regulation-driven. Legislation is imperative to establishing the legal status of emission permits or allowances. Enforcement and punishment are required in the event of non-compliance or misconduct, where permits are not surrendered as stipulated, prescribed trading rules are violated, or data reporting is found to be misleading. China's regulatory infrastructure for CO 2 emission trading is far from complete. There are considerable challenges in setting up a consistent and transparent monitoring, reporting and verification system in China [22, 23] , where legal enforcement is constantly a problem confronting all levels of the society.
Currently, there are no national regulations specifically for emission trading, and the on-going ETS programme proceeds as an administrative operation [18, 21] .
Some empirical studies have shown that the lack of a robust regulatory system has discouraged business participation. For instance, Zhao et al. find that regulated enterprises are "unaware of operation rules and running process of carbon market" [14, p. 1241] . Even they are aware of these, many of them tend to believe that local governments are not serious about enforcing compliance [4] . Shen echoes this comment by suggesting that some of the big and powerful enterprises could find ways for evading penalties for their excess GHG emissions and failure to surrender allowances, particularly at the local level [19] . Although many new regulatory measures have been introduced over the last two years [12, 16] , their impacts on business participation and investors' confidence are yet to be seen.
A possible outcome of these weaknesses in market regulation and management is the poor performance of the carbon market in delivering economic efficiency. In particular, abnormal changes in allowance price are regarded as an indication of the failure of market to function efficiently as economic theory predicts. Many studies have attempted to identify these changes by modelling emission permits price, and they can be divided into three approaches according to their analytical focus.
Some researchers focus on the price determinants of allowances in the EU ETS or other mature carbon markets [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] . They found that there are long-run relationships between emission allowance prices and external factors, such as weather, energy prices and economic shocks, but the presence of these relationships varies by sample and time, requiring longer-term market data to forecast. Since the Shenzhen ETS has a relatively short history of operation (three years), this pricing model does not fit our study. Some other researchers put their emphasis on identifying the interactive impacts between carbon spot price and futures price [51, 52] . However, this approach is not feasible for our analysis because futures are currently not available for trading in Chinese carbon markets.
The third approach involves the use of different econometrics techniques to test the short-term behaviours of allowance spot prices [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] . The GARCH model was advocated by Benz and Trück [54] and experimented by themselves and other scholars [53, 55, 58] , and all of these researchers have reported statistically satisfactory results in capturing the price volatility in the international carbon markets. Very few studies have explored the financial aspects of a Chinese ETS. Our inquiry searched for such market abnormalities by processing the GARCH model to examine the three-year spot price behaviour of Shenzhen ETS CO 2 allowance, and attempted to assess an actual outcome of this policy intervention from a financial perspective.
Research hypothesis
This empirical study aimed at investigating the functioning of a carbon market by examining price behaviour. The analysis is based on the autoregressive moving average (ARMA)-GARCH-M model (described below), which is commonly used for assessing the returns of financial products, especially stock returns, and their volatility, which is taken as a measure of risk [25, 60, 61] . In economics, emission allowances are understood as a form of property rights and assets that display certain financial properties when they are exchanged in markets [54, 62, 63] . One of the key properties is a broadly symmetric relationship between expected risk and asset return [26, 64] . As the variance of asset returns can be used to explain expected risk [65] , the coefficient between returns and the conditional variance of returns can describe risk premium. In an efficient stock market, perceived risk of investment would run parallel to expected gains; thus risk premium is a function of expected risks, i.e. the parameter of risk premium should be positive. Most applications of GARCH-M model find that transactions in a properly functioning stock market demonstrate a positive correlation between these two elements, namely, yield and its conditional variance [25, 66, 67] .
Our assumption about the Shenzhen ETS was that the trade prices of emission allowance should demonstrate this financial property. This is because an ETS creates a market institution, typically resembling a stock market. Shenzhen was chosen for the case study as its 'cap-and-trade' scheme is regarded as better than the other six Chinese ETSs, because it is more market-oriented, active, and properly designed, has acquired a more solid legal basis, and has the longest history (i.e. experience) of operation. Our hypothesis is that expected returns in Shenzhen's allowance-based market positively correlate with its volatility. Evidence for the otherwise case would suggest that this market remains immature on this dimension and therefore requires regulatory attention and economic fixes.
Methods
Data collection
The data used in the analysis were the daily records on allowance price and trading volume. They were collected from the official website of the Shenzhen Emissions Therefore, to present the time series of the return { } and introduce its risk by {ℎ }, the mean equation (1) in GARCH-M model of { } can be written as: The autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model was proposed by Box et al. [71] for modelling a time-varying time series. Thus the equation (1) of the time series { } applied by the ARMA ( , ) model can be specified as: Therefore, the ARMA ( , )-GARCH ( , )-M model can be specified as: where is the parameter of risk premium, which is the level of impact on return series from anticipatable risk calculated by conditional variance ℎ and represent the relationship between expected risk and expected return.
Benz and Trück have used the GARCH model capturing CO 2 allowances price volatility [54] . They conducted an empirical analysis of EUA prices in the first two years of EU ETS, and showed that the plot of spot prices and returns demonstrated asymmetry, excess kurtosis or heavy tails. Benz and Trück [54] suggested that the main barrier to overcome in further analysis was the lack of adequate amount of data. Subsequently, these researchers applied the AR-GARCH model to two different short periods, namely, in-sample and out-of-sample, of EUA spot prices and log-return. They come to the conclusion that the GARCH model significantly outperforms the model with constant variance, and can be regarded as an adequate approach for modelling emission allowance log-return [55] .
Another group of researchers employed various kinds of GARCH-type structure to examine the behaviours of two different kinds of emission allowance, i.e. As a normal expansion of GARCH model, GARCH-M has been widely used in the research of risk premium of financial market, especially the stock market [61, [72] [73] [74] . There are also many studies on the relationship between risk and return of bulk commodities, such as oil prices [75] and agricultural products prices [76, 77] .
Moreover, the ARMA-GARCH-M approaches have been employed to model the mean and volatility of wind speed [78] . However, few studies have used the GARCH-M model to examine the risk premium of emission allowance. To fill this knowledge gap, the present research expanded the GARCH to GARCH in mean to examine our research hypothesis as followed.
These studies suggest that the GARCH model and its variants are useful for understanding the financial performance of carbon markets. None of them, however, involves the allowance-based market in China. We used the abovementioned technique for our Chinese study and produced the following results. Table 2 
Results
The data
Time series analysis
To satisfy the stationarity requirement of time series in the GARCH model, we used log-returns of daily average prices for showing their volatility behavior. The log-returns are the first difference of the logarithm of prices can be calculated by this formula: = 100 * ln( / −1 ), where and −1 are the average allowance prices of on day and − 1 respectively. The Eviews Version 7 was used to build the ARMA-GARCH and ARMA-GARCH-M models for the log-returns of prices.
The time plot of the log-returns series for the entire study period is presented
in Figure 4 . It shows that volatility varies with time, and there are heteroscedasticity and volatility clustering. The descriptive statistics for log-returns and the result of the three kinds of stationarity test are reported in Table 3 . The skewness parameter is positive (0.275), indicating that the time series is right-skewed. The kurtosis parameter (7.201) well exceeds 3, suggesting leptokurtosis and fat-tails. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics, which is used to check for normality, rejects the null hypothesis that the log-returns are normally distributed. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller(ADF) test [79] and Philips-Perron [80] test [81] statistics is -21.04327
and -60.53277, greater than the critical value and significant at the 1% level, thus rejecting the null hypothesis of the existence of unit root. To confirm the stationarity of the series, we conducted the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test [82] .
Results showed that the null hypothesis of a stationary process is not rejected. This suggests that the log-returns can be described as a stationary financial time series and satisfy the stationarity requirement of the GARCH model.
We used the ARMA-GARCH and ARMA-GARCH-M to model the time series.
The first step was constructing an ARMA model and identifying the orders of the autoregressive and moving average terms based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) [83] , Schwarz Criterion (SC) [84] and log likelihood measures. We created and tested the nine different ARMA models: AR (1) Table 3 . For AIC statistics, the smallest value is 7.5074, pointing the optimal choice is ARMA (3,2) ; for SC statistics, the smallest value is 7.5348 pointing the optimal choice is ARMA (1,2) ; and for R-squared and adjusted R-Squared, the largest value at 0.2705 and 0.2653, both pointing the optimal choice is ARMA (3,2).
Generally, the optimal structure of the ARMA model for this time series is ARMA (3,2).For GARCH, we chose a basic and commonly used GARCH model, i.e.
GARCH (1, 1) . This model is suitable for analyzing the log-return time series of the price of emission allowances, which can be regarded as a financial asset, and investigating and forecasting its time-varying dynamics pattern. The ARMA (3,2)-GARCH (1,1) model can be written as:
Variance equation:
By adding a heteroscedasticity term in the mean equation, the ARMA (3,2)-GARCH
(1,1)-M model can be specified as:
Mean equation:
where is the parameter of the relationship between the returns of emission allowance as a financial asset and its conditional variance (heteroscedasticity term)
reflecting the uncertainty of return or expected risk. This coefficient is the trade-off of risk return. The underlying assumption is that financial assets that incur higher risks are likely to yield higher returns, which compensate for bearing risk.
Thus, high volatility of an effective financial market is expected to generate a risk premium for assets [30] .
Results of ARMA-GARCH modelling are reported in Table 4 . In the variance equation, the coefficients of 1 and 1 are positive and their p-values show they are significant at the level of 1 %, indicating that the ARMA-GARCH model is statistically robust. The sum of 1 and 1 is 0.987, which is below but close to 1, satisfying the assumption of GARCH, which demonstrates a long-term memory in the volatility of returns or price dynamics due to the impacts of shocks from news [85] .
Overall, the results show that the time series of returns have a GARCH effect and follow the normal pattern of volatility, like a form of a financial asset.
Results of ARMA-GARCH-M modelling are reported in Table 5 . In the variance equation, the coefficients of 1 ′ and 1 ′ are also positive and their p-values show they are significant at the level of 1 %, indicating that the ARMA-GARCH-M model is statistically robust. The sum of 1 + 1 is 0.992, meaning that it is a stable model.
In the mean equation, however, the coefficient of has a negative sign (-0.010) and is significant at the 5% level. This means that a one-unit increase in risk (i.e. the conditional variance of returns) is associated with a decline in returns by 0.010 unit.
That is, there is a negative relationship between expected yield and expected risk.
Comparison with other findings
In Section 3.1, we have indicated that existing studies on emission allowance prices have different analytic emphases. A common finding among those focusing on price determinants is that structural breaks exist in the price sequences of EUAs. These structural breaks could be explained by regulatory change [46] or market participants' expectations [47] . As carbon futures are currently not available in
Chinese carbon markets, the findings of studies focusing on the relationship between spot and futures prices have little relevance for our studies. Nonetheless, this will become a potentially important research topic when the carbon futures market begins operation in China.
Some studies sought to capture the stochastic of price behaviour of CO 2 permits.
For example, Daskalakis et al. [56] have found a highly discontinuous price jump in 2006 and non-stationarity in spot and futures data in European markets (i.e.
Powernext, Nord Pool and ECX), and suggested that the main reason is the restriction of banking in the early stages of the EU ETS. We did not find an clear-cut price break in Shenzhen's carbon allowance data, but only a general decline in price and high volatility. Seifert et al. [59] reported a brief empirical analysis of the return series of EUA, which demonstrated low autocorrelations. Our empirical results have also identified a similar autocorrelative effect of return series in Shenzhen. Moreover, our statistical strategy was informed by Paolella and Taschini(Mixed-normal GARCH)
[58], Benz and Trück (Markov switching and GARCH ) [55] and Benschop and Cabrera (MS-GARCH) [53] . Both the findings of these previous studies and ours have indicated heteroscedasticity and heavy tail in the allowance price series with fluctuation cluster. However, our research contributes to knowledge by expanding the GARCH process to GARCH-M to the log-return series, and producing a negative coefficient between return and the expected risk reflected by the conditional variance, which is intuitively intriguing.
Discussion
The results reported above provide mixed evidence for our research hypothesis. We found that the volatility of allowance prices in Shenzhen does correlate with the rate of expected asset returns, but in the opposite way, i.e. asset returns are negatively associated with risk premium. This suggests that expected gains decline as risks increase, standing at odds with the usual expectation in the financial market and the prediction of asset pricing theory [80] . In addition, significant fluctuations and excessively high kurtosis were found in the records of trading volume. Several block trades were concentrated in a few days, while the daily trading volume over a three-year period was modest. The two outliners, reported in Figure 1 above, appear to be an unusual market movement driven by private negotiations between institutional buyers and sellers. The fact that these bulk transactions account for nearly half of the total trading volume across the three-year period raises question about market liquidity and market domination by a handful of participants.
The observed price pattern can be seen as a possible outcome of the market imperfections in China. As Zhang [5] has indicated, emission allowances are overallocated and there are considerable uncertainties regarding the duration of the validity of allowances as financial assets. Also, many enterprises tend to believe that the governments are not serious in enforcing compliance. As a consequence, they engage in emission trading only for compliance purposes and do not participate in emissions trading until the last minute. The lack of momentum in the Chinese carbon market might result in abnormal movements in price and trading volume, such as the negative coefficient of GARCH-M model, single days with extremely high trading volume, and the declines in price, as demonstrated by our study.
Although the Shenzhen ETS has advantages over the other six Chinese ETSs, it is yet to move beyond its primitive form of quasi-market. Without being able to eliminate concerns about financial maturity, our findings provide additional evidence about the limitations of the pilot ETSs operating in China, which is broadly consistent with earlier assessments reported elsewhere [14, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . There is a general consensus among researchers and practitioners that the Chinese ETSs currently do not demonstrate the properties of a well-functioning market [4, 5, 14, 21, 23] . The fact that they remain financially immature and result in price abnormalities may be explained in terms of market liquidity and information uncertainties.
The secondary market is poorly developed. At present, only spot trading is permitted, whereas futures and options are absent from the Chinese carbon market.
The lack of opportunities for hedging and speculation from future price movements undermines incentives for diverting capital to this market. Instead, compliance with regulations is the main objective of engaging in emission trading. Most of the liable entities, largely state-owned entreprises, participate in emission trading for the reason of controlling their GHG emissions and meeting their compliance obligations, with little interest in turning it into an investment [21] . In fact, there is a general lack of knowledge about how carbon markets and trading systems work [19, 38, 86] .
Some of these entreprises managed to acquire a basic understanding about trading rules and carbon asset management, but "their [market] consciousness is weak and attitude is negative" [14, p] . 1241. Consequently, participation in emission trading is merely viewed as a responsibility, whereas the sense of investment remains weak.
This viewpoint finds evidence from a market research report published in 2014, which involves a survey of enterprises covered by the Shanghai ETS. The report shows that only 6% (9 out of 152) of these enterprises prepared to actively participate in trading, purchasing and selling emission allowances, whereas the rest assumed a passive role [27, p.62] . Many liable entities put their allocations into warehouse, rather than releasing them to the market. Investments account for only a handful of market transactions [14] . Small daily deals are driven by needs.
On the other hand, many large deals involve government intervention. In the Chinese political economy, local and provincial governments have substantial influence over the private sector within their jurisdictions and are able to prompt companies to engage in 'trading' with each other. Liu, Chen [21] argue that emission trading in China is primarily driven by the administrative commands from the government. The first transactions in Beijing and Shanghai carbon exchanges were negotiated deals coordinated by local governments. As the prices were formed by agreement between two parties, they were far from competitive and played limited guiding role [21] . Non-market pressures offer a possible explanation for the abnormal price behavior and the presence of unusual bulk transactions, which warrants further research to validate.
Information uncertainties may also contribute to market abnormalities. In China, carbon emission data are far from complete and consistent [18, 23] . This increases difficulties for market participants to predict and speculate on relative demand and manage investment portfolios. Moreover, market participants tend to be conservative when a new market is formed. Liable entities with excess allowances hesitate to sell out, whereas those running short of allowances are keen on buying in.
Thus, allowance supply and demand often move apart in the early days of business when the market and regulatory conditions (e.g. the abundance of allowances and auction arrangements) are uncertain to all parties, including investors and brokers [27, p.64] . The declining supply and growing demand may result in a price surge. To date, this issue remains unresolved as little information about the prospective national ETS has been released and the future of the pilot ETSs remains uncertain.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study examined the volatility behavior of the emission allowances changed hands under the Shenzhen ETS in China. Its novelty lies in the use of the ARMA-GARCH-M technique for modelling asset returns series and analysing allowance price data recorded in China. We found that the rate of return was negatively associated with expected risk represented by the conditional variance, and this stands at odds with the usual expectation in the financial market. In addition, there were significant fluctuations and excessively high kurtosis in trading volume.
Although the Shenzhen ETS has been operating for more than three years since June 2013 and has many advantages over its counterparts in China, more work is needed to turn it into a mature market in which yield would normally increase with volatility. 
